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Solitary Amnesia as National Memory: FromHabermas to Luhmann
Rodanthi Tzanelli, Sociology and Social Research, UK
Abstract: The repressive mechanisms of collective memory have been the subject of a fierce debate in the human sciences
- especially, but not exclusively, in the study of nationalism. This paper re-investigates the nature of national memory in
the context of European nationalisms by drawing on contemporary national cases of remembering and forgetting. The explored
instances are mobilized in the study of remembering/forgetting on a factual, rather than ideal level. Theoretically, it is argued
that the Habermassian call for fostering ‘anamnestic solidarity’ with the past often fails in practice because of its normative
undertones that disagree with Realpolitic demands. This is so because nationalist discourse, which serves to preserve the
political interests of the national community, has to present itself to political forces that reside outside the community as a
closed, autopoetic system akin to that theorized by Niklas Luhmann. Although the Luhmannian thesis (which would gesture
towards the autonomisation of national memory) also fails to explain the nature of nationalist remembering/forgetting tout
court, it allows more space for an exploration of nationalist self-presentation than Habermas’ normative stance. The argument
in this study, which combines an appreciation of hermeneutics and autopoeia, is that the practice of (re)producing the
‘nation’s’ solitary amnesia enables nationalist discourse to respond to external political pressures. This presents the latter
as a dialogical/hermeneutic project despite its solipsistic ‘façade’.
Keywords: Collective Memory, Europe, Habermas, Hermeneutics, Luhmann, Nationalism
Theory and Memory: Habermas and
Luhmann
CONTEMPORARY SCENARIOS HAVEit that we live in a post-national era: global-isation has gone a long way, and the socio-
economic changes it has triggered are bound
to form cracks in traditional forms of communal
solidarity. There has been a slow denationalisation
and simultaneous global commodification of memory
with heritage industries displaying national treasures
for external tourist consumption (Urry 1995: 165).
Considering globally televised images of identity,
media theorists point out that the ‘banalization’
(Billig 1995) of culture triggers processes that change
the face of nations and localities in unpredictable
ways (Held 2000: 1-3). The advent of new media
technologies with global appeal such as the Internet
open up possibilities for the production of cosmopol-
itan versions of identity, thus slowly removing na-
tional specificity from the socio-political plain (see
Szerszynski and Urry 2006). New forms of sociality
are allegedly characterised by amnesiac tendencies
more than ever (Huyssen 1995; Huyssen 2000). At
the turn of the 21st century nationally embedded un-
derstandings of culture and belonging come under
theoretical attack from every possible side.
At the same time, the growing number of civil
conflicts and harrowing wars waged around the
world, counters such claims and brings to the fore
the workings of national identity and nationalism as
a contemporaneous political force. At the heart of
this debate rests the explosive potential that narrating
and manipulating a common past may have, as well
as the importance of such a past for securing national
solidarity. This manipulation of memory is, un-
doubtedly, a political tool in the hands of those who
represent the national community at any time in his-
tory, and its scholarly study calls for a contextual
assessment of Realpolitik visions. Another
problématique that arises from the selfsame phe-
nomenon is that of the ethics of such manipulation:
what happens to the sufferers of past atrocities com-
mitted in the name of any nation? Can the ‘amnesiac
elixir’ turn into the most dangerous poison when
envisaging the community’s harmonious future? The
moral burden of Aufarbeitung, Adorno’s Freudian
take on the conscious reappraisal of the past
(1986[1959]: 115), rests heavily on the shoulders of
national communities that built their fictional solid-
arity on repression of ethnic difference, racist discrim-
ination and genocide. This paper vies for an under-
standing of the workings of national amnesia. It is
argued that the solitary form national remembering
appears to have, its inclination to exclude any kind
of disruptive critical intervention from outside, may
be just a ‘façade’. Behind this solipsistic ‘façade’
there is a re-working of critical interventions into a
coherent narrative, which may be ‘systemic’ (in
Niklas Luhmann’s terms) in nature, but are still based
on a rational hermeneutic assessment of the socio-
political environment in which nations live. A theor-
etical move between Luhmannian autopoeia and
Habermassian hermeneutics allows for an analysis
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of remembering and forgetting in contemporary na-
tionalist environments.
Habermas’ contribution in the ‘Historians’ Debate’
(Historikerstreit) relates to the status of German
memory following the humiliating end of the Second
World War. The Adenauer government in West
Germany had recognised the country’s responsibility
for the genocide and agreed to pay reparations to the
survivors of the Holocaust (Herf 1997). But even the
act of ‘compensation’ simply reflected the general
consensus that this past needs to be ‘normalised’,
that German self-respect has to be restored at all
costs, if the country wants to have a future. In this
climate, any connections between National Socialism
and anti-Semitism had to be repressed, even if they
were still present in German socio-political life. In-
evitably, the phantom of Nazism would haunt intel-
lectual debates of the era too. From Gerard Ritter’s
defensive take on Nazism’s populist base in the
1960s, to Fritz Fisher’s Sonderweg approach to
German history, to the functionalists of the 1970s,
for whom the genocide was the ‘nasty work’ of a
minority, the German nation was portrayed as a vic-
tim of, rather than an actor in the Holocaust. Michael
Stürmer’s ‘Land Without an History’ (1986) set the
nationalist tone in the 1980s with its critique of ab-
sence of any positive German history, and Ernst
Nolte’s ‘The Past That Does Not Want To Pass’ of-
ficially opened the Historikerstreit (6 June 1986),
with the argument that the Holocaust was a über-
schießende reaktion (overshooting reaction) to
Bolshevik crimes (Postone 1990).
One could argue that in the German context the
debate on national memory formed a deferred ‘re-
sponse to the great trauma of modernity’ (Klein
2000: 140): the World Wars. In the conservative
camp, this attempt to repress the damaging aspects
of a universally condemned past, produced a process
of what I will call ‘solitary amnesia’, whereby the
German nation’s spokesmen alone chose to strategic-
ally remember and forget components of their nation-
al past – a perfect replication of the liberal Hobbesian
argument of contractual oblivion that ensures the
protection of the community from endogenous divi-
sions (Wolin 1989).
This attitude was rejected by Habermas (1997)
who questioned the ethical implications of forgetting
and emphasised the German nation’s moral account-
ability for its past. For Habermas the liberal revision-
ist argument dissociates memory from distribution
of justice, or relativises past atrocities by removing
them from their context. In The New Conservatism
(1989a) he accuses such revisionist perspectives of
neo-conservatism, and stresses the German nation’s
need to establish a connection with the deceased of
the Holocaust. Habermas followed Benjamin’s
(1992[1968]) reflections on the eradication of remem-
brance from people’s lives after the Great War, but
also the sudden moral awakening this triggered in
the face of total memory loss. Habermas attempted
to revive the Benjaminian idea of ‘anamnestic
solidarity’ (Lenhardt 1975: 136) that war survivors
create with the dead (Misztal 2003: 45; Fussell 1975).
But Adorno’s critique of the post-Second World War
culture of forgetting also determined Habermas’
political stance: forgetting our moral debt to the past
threatens the future of democratic principles as it
forecloses the possibility for critical self-appraisal
(see also Ricoeur 1999).
This is crucial: unlike other Frankfurt school
scholars (Marcuse 1955: 34-5), Adorno contended
that ‘the effacement of memory is more the
achievement of an all-too-wakeful consciousness
than it is the result of its weakness in the face of the
superiority of unconscious processes’ (Adorno
1986[1959]: 1117, emphasis mine). The genealogy
of the Historikerstreit itself suggests that, in Ger-
many, the creed of nationalism - which invariably
fosters identity on the basis of historical continuity
but consciously uses collective memory as a political
instrument - was closely connected to liberal histor-
ical relativism. Habermas opposed this ‘artificial re-
suscitation of nationalist patriotism that [was] offered
as a sort of compensation for damages’ (Duvenage
1999: 8-9) and defended the adoption of a constitu-
tional patriotic model in its place, which combines
‘universalist demands of liberal principles and the
need for a robust political identity, including a shared
history’ (Mizstal 2003; Habermas 1996). His model
of political belonging formed an attempt to re-estab-
lish Germany’s link to Western Enlightenment tradi-
tions (Pensky 1989: 356-58) and replace neo-conser-
vative emotionalism, rife with narratives of national
victimisation, with a rational self-understanding of
our moral obligations to the past (Habermas 1989a:
227). In the same vein, for Habermas the historian’s
mission is to resurrect and keep alive all the cultural
traditions of the nation – to act as a public intellectual
ready to critique past political errors.
Habermas unambiguously drew upon Benjaminian
soteriological observations on the philosophy of
history. For Benjamin, the historian-as-Messiah
‘comes not only as the redeemer, he comes as the
subduer of Antichrist’ (1968: 247). This apocalyptic
vision of historical interpretation (Pensky 1989: 366-
8) is, however, also helplessly utopian, in so far as
it does not resolve the question of how memory is
put into public discourse effectively. Although
Habermassian hermeneutics escape the theological
trap, they do not avoid Benjaminian utopianism: the
ethics of collective memory do not resolve political
dilemmas. National communities have to manipulate
their past in the struggle for self-preservation, which
commences every time they receive external pres-
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sures that target collectively revered pasts. Although
on an ideal level Habermas’ militant stance remains
admirable, on a pragmatic level it fails to explain
how real-life time national communities appear to
absorb criticisms that originate in the international
political environment in which they live. The absorp-
tion of externally produced shocks aims to preserve
the social terrain of the national community intact.
This is made possible through the modification of
collective self-presentations controlled by the centres
of political power. Nation-states control the mechan-
ism of anamnestic autopoeia, a mechanism which
allows for the creative reproduction of the cult of
collective narcissism (Hohendahl 1995: 56-7).
Arendt’s dual perspective of political judgement
captures the actualisation of this ‘cult’: unlike her
Benjaminian historical spectator (Yar 2000: 1-3),
the nation-state as the custodian of formal historical
records also becomes an actor that shapes the moral
universe of the national community.
Resorting to Luhmannian understandings of insti-
tutionalised patterns of behaviour found in state ap-
paratuses, we gain more insight into the political
manipulation of memory. Luhmann (1982) would
argue that the inclination social systems display to
devise ways of reducing their complexity stems from
decisions of the moment. Such decisions nevertheless
result in the constitution of meaning for the system.
Meaning is therefore the outcome of a series of ra-
tional selections and rejections of possibilities that
originate in the environment in which the system
exists, but whose incorporation or exclusion only
aims to stabilise the system itself, not to establish a
dialogue with the environment. Luhmann (1990) put
into use Maturana’s concept of autopoesis (self-
making) to explain the development of the state
among other system formations, and later to recon-
stitute sociological discourse in terms of meaning,
communication and their relationship to the environ-
ment (1995).
We may view state-controlled versions of national
memory in terms of systems, whose aspiration is al-
ways to function better, prioritising efficiency and
self-preservation. State-induced obliterations of
memory betray the workings of a closed system
which ‘operates in a selective way, as much in the
plane of structures as in that of the processes: there
are always other possibilities that can be selected
when one pursuits an order’ (Luhmann 1995: 137).
Solitary amnesia appears to operate on a totally self-
referential level, using suggestions that circulate in
the political environment of the nation-state to legit-
imate the latter’s sovereignty and protect national
solidarity in the face of external criticisms that may
complicate national-as-political life (Ray 1996;
Balibar and Wallerstein 1991). In this instance na-
tional consensus and the maintenance of a robust
political centre go hand in hand (Ricoeur 2004: 85).
Attempts to produce consensual memory narratives
primarily belong to centripetal institutions, such as
the educational system, which ‘will turn out worthy,
loyal and competent members of the total society’
(Gellner 1983: 64; Smith 1991: 16). Nationalist ver-
sions of memory rely on an easily identifiable
strategy: that of borrowing from pre-existing cultures
and ideas to invent the ‘nation’ – ‘a reality for better
or worse, and in general an inescapable one’ (ibid.
49). The shift from acknowledging the presence of
historical contradictions that shape national identities
to selecting suitable historical narratives that make
identity politically plausible resolves Arendt’s con-
tradictions of action and spectatorship on a pragmatic
level. The convergence of enunciative and institution-
al authority in the nation’s pedagogy (cor)responds
to the intersection of the horizontal bond of living
with the vertical bond of authority – a move that ac-
tualises the social (Ricoeur 2004: 60, 167).
Yet, a question arising from Luhmannian under-
standings of complexity is the total absence of inter-
personal communication: Luhmann’s model of ‘so-
cial systems’ is totally devoid of human agency and
reduces Verstehen into a mechanical ritual (see
Habermas 1971). Social systems appear to be opera-
tionally closed, as the only contact they make with
the environment is based on their own self-preserva-
tion. Likewise, Realpolitik visions of national-as-
political order tend to sideline social justice, truth
and even consensual legitimation of power (Haber-
mas’ main concerns), which is usually monitored in
international politics: they use technocratic strokes
to brush the social.
In response to Luhmann, Habermas (1989b) de-
veloped a theory that outlines the increasing ration-
alisation of the ‘lifeworld’ with the help of systemic
steering media, such as money and power (on which
see also Luhmann 1999). He understands societies
as both systems and lifeworlds but separates life-
world action, which is based on consensus, from
systems activity, which controls the social without
requiring consensus (1989b: 118-9). We must situate
solitary amnesia therefore in the process of systemic
integration, as its function is to fabricate national
solidarity through anodyne, guilt-free forms of re-
membering. To follow the trail of Habermas’ thought
(1989b: 183), solitary amnesia produces organic
forms of solidarity (Durkheim 1964[1893]). Solitary
amnesia is used by systemic power (the nation-state)
to simultaneously project an image of solidarity
outside the nation’s lifeworld (the universe of the
community) and to organise the lifeworld of the na-
tional community internally.
In view of these observations it is more correct to
argue that solitary amnesia may retain the cultural
and linguistic properties that characterise the trans-
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mission of informal memory traditions: it is dialogic-
al and malleable because external referents tend to
slide into its structures all the time, modifying them.
But because solitary amnesia is formalised by state
power, it also belongs to the structural conditions of
the nation’s lifeworld (Habermas 1987: 355) – it
operates, in Habermas’ words, a tergo (Habermas
1989b: 135). The contingent potential of social inter-
action happens outside institutional contexts. In or-
ganised domains of national memory story telling
becomes embedded in plausible versions of history
to reconstruct the psychosocial matter of communic-
ative action both for external and internal ‘consump-
tion’. Solitary national amnesia is never a truly sol-
ipsistic product; it only uses autopoetic techniques
to cover up the embarrassment of communications
with a critical environment (Todorov 2003: 123).
Solitary Amnesia in Action: Some
European Examples
The types of sociality solitary amnesia produces are
not norm-free but manipulate the normative potential
of memory. We need only link Stürmer’s lamentation
of missing positive histories to strategic decisions of
German power apparatuses: his support of ‘patriotic’
history was also a response to international criticism
levelled against Nazi atrocities, and the international
control imposed upon the German state, following
the end of the Second World War. Although Stürmer
claimed at the time that he was writing on his own
accord, left-wing intellectuals saw in his argument
the agenda of Chancellor Helmut Kohl for whom
Stürmer, is rumoured, acted as personal consultant.
We must place then solitary amnesia within its sys-
temic political context to understand it: between
1984-6 Chancellor Kohl had devised a plan that
aimed at re-positioning Germany in European and
international politics. On 22 September 1984 he and
the French president François Mitterrand met at
Verdun to commemorate the deaths of both World
Wars. This act marked the beginning of a political
relationship that formed an important motor for
European integration. A year later, Kohl’s meeting
with US President Ronald Reagan ‘coincided’ with
the commemoration of the ‘Victory in Europe Day’
(7 May 1945). This was followed by a series of other
appeals at reconciliation, which culminated in Re-
agan and Kohl’s visit of the German military
cemetery in Bitburg, where members of the Waffen-
SS were buried. This manipulation of memory, which
conflated Holocaust remembrance with a forgetting
of Nazi brutalities, aroused criticism, as it followed
right after the two politicians’ visits to the Belsen
concentration camp. Kohl’s comment following the
post-1989 German unification that had he grown up
in the Eastern zone ‘he wouldn’t know which route
he would have taken’ (Gordon 1993: 3-4), further
emphasizes the point: memory and forgetting are
coupled in political maneuvers to assist in German
self-(re)presentation. Likewise, Stürmer and Nolte’s
work immortalised war-induced structural changes
in the workings of German national memory, which
threatened the integrity of German identity. Solitary
amnesia appears in moments that become critical for
the survival of national lifeworlds, we may say
(Habermas 1989b: 291-292; Ray 1999), for crises
act coercively on the production of solidarity.
Other national communities reached a critical
point, at which a systemic re-organisation was neces-
sary – hence the need to ‘forget’ unsavoury aspects
of their past. In France both Gaullists and Commun-
ists fostered a heroic image of French resistance,
foreclosing thus a painful exposure of the crimes of
the Vichy regime. The only change in the narratives
proffered by each side had to do with questions of
leadership: whereas Gaullists favoured the idea of a
French resistance led by the military, the Commun-
ists supported the idea of a working-class led resist-
ance (Azéma 1984: 210; Todorov 2003: 205). The
‘Vichy syndrome’ (Rousso 1991) eventually became
a metaphor for universal French collaboration with
Nazi genocide of over 70,000 French Jews. Universal
criticism of the Holocaust led to a bizarre reorienta-
tion of French understandings of wartime experience
around Judaeo-Christian values and a reconstruction
of ‘the entire history of the Occupation in terms of
Vichy’s anti-Semitism […], thereby marginalizing
the roles played by other factors, especially the Res-
istance’ (Gordon 1995: 496) in atrocities. Péan’s
analysis of Mitterrand’s relationship with former
Vichy police minister Renè Bousquet added fuel to
the fire, as it suggested that forgetting was a matter
of political agendas more so than of ethics. Vichy-
centred solitary amnesia followed up to the trial of
Paul Trouvier in 1992-4, Bousquet’s cause celebre
that ended in 1993 with his assassination (Carrier
1994), and Mitterrand’s joined televised interview
with Péan on the French President’s Vichy connec-
tions. The need of the French left to be recognised
as the political fortress of Europe against the Nazi
sway produced an ethics-free image of French left-
wing agency that began to crumble only in recent
years. The Vichy syndrome ‘consists of a diverse set
of symptoms whereby […] particularly that trauma
resulting from internal divisions within France, re-
veals itself in political, cultural, and social life’
(Rousso 1991: 10). Solitary amnesia is then not just
the product of right-wing politics, but of solidarity
qua power legitimacy that dictates a Vergangenheits-
bewältigung.
Italian solitary amnesia manifested itself in July
2003 with Italy’s ascendancy to the Presidency of
the European Council. This coincided with debates
concerning the nature of the European Constitution
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- a decision based on the imminent accession of many
new Central and Eastern European countries to the
Union - and the war on Iraq that had already divided
the European community. The Italian Prime Minister
Silvio Berlusconi, a declared critic of Franco-German
domination in questions of EU policy, ardent defend-
er of Italian nationalist interests in the European
political arena and supporter of the Bush administra-
tion, was already a target for other European leaders,
due to his dubious domestic manoeuvres that secured
him a victory in the national elections. His opening
address as President to the European Parliament (2
July 2003) was met with brutal criticism by left-wing
MEPs who highlighted the recently passed Italian
law that granted senior public officials immunity
during Berlusconi’s office. MEP Martin Schulz, the
Deputy Head of Social Democrats in European Par-
liament, critiqued Berlusconi’s coalition with Lega
Nord, a nationalist party with an explicitly racist
agenda on immigration, as well as Berlusconi’s
general policies that violated the EU Human Rights
Charter.
Berlusconi’s response was that Schulz should take
up the role of a kapò in a film about Nazi concentra-
tion camps (International Herald Tribune, 2 July
2003). This caused a universal outcry in the European
community. Kapòs were not Nazi officials but pris-
oners of the Nazi regime who had committed crimin-
al offences. Such prisoners would often be appointed
by the Nazis to oversee the work of other prisoners
in camps (Levi 1979: 39-40). The confusion probably
arose from Berlusconi’s political illiteracy, yet it was
widely accepted that he had portrayed Schulz as a
Nazi camp guard (BBC News, 2 July 2003). Ber-
lusconi refused to apologise for his racist comment,
and when his attitude found support in Lega Nord
members of his government the protest became near-
universal within Italy. Berlusconi’s populist nation-
alist style deserves closer attention however, because
it bears the mark of solitary amnesia. What he did
in effect, was to ‘write out’ Italy’s involvement in
these dark pages of European history: by calling a
German MEP a ‘Nazi’ he was aligning his own
country with the winners of the war, foreclosing any
discussion of Italian fascist history. What was, of
course, silenced, was Berlusconi’s alliance with the
neo-Fascist Alleanza Nationale party after the 1994
national elections (still symbolically connected to
Mussolini’s Italy), and his rumoured continuous
‘relationship’ with these circles. Italian solitary am-
nesia was political-systemic in its nature and served
to preserve intact an Italian national image abroad.
By extension, the defence of Italian pride against the
‘bad’ Germans was just a way of attacking Franco-
German political plans in the EU.
There are, however, cases of systemic failure fol-
lowed by lifeworld disintegration – or, to use more
conventional vocabulary, political crises that lead to
a collapse of established notions of identity and the
state itself – that can produce solitary amnesia and
new forms of collective memory. The concern here
is more with the emergence of national systems that
support new lifeworlds following the collapse of
multi-ethnic complexity - e.g. federations that encom-
pass many ethnicities. Such systemic reorganisations
can have catastrophic consequences, as they lead to
bloody conflict and genocides akin to those of the
Second World War. Civil war in the former Yugoslav
space fostered conflicting narratives of the past and
worked as a platform for ethnic self-presentation.
Interestingly, it was Slobodan Milosevic’s decision
to organise the 600th ‘national’ commemoration of
the battle of Kosovo (1389), where Serbian prince
Lazar was defeated by Sultan Murat, that further in-
tensified regional tensions and led to war. This
commemorative ritual also encompassed informal
traditions that implicitly likened Albanian Kosovars,
the object of discord in the so-called ‘second battle
of Kosovo’, to the ‘infidel’ Turks, a historical enemy
for the Serb nation (Ray 1999: 2.6). In addition, the
collapse of the Yugoslav state led to a recounting of
massacres and further commemorative rituals: ‘the
Communists were mass murderers (of Ustasas and
Chetniks); the Croatian (fascists) state of 1941-45,
were murderers of Serbs; the Muslims were collab-
orators with Nazi genocide; while the new Croatian
state under Tuj_man diminished the extent of the
Ustashe genocide thus provoking further trauma-
rage’ (ibid.: 2.8). The Yugoslav systemic collapse
fostered a specific mode of solitary amnesia: unlike
repressed pasts (mass murders), which bore the
stigma of self-guilt, such selectively resurrected pasts
supported self-victimisation.
Memories of displacement and massacre on the
Julian March also haunt Balkan nations. Its partition
after the Second World War was echoed in the 1991
division of the Istrian Peninsula between Slovenia
and Croatia. The rearrangement of political borders
after the Second World War led to the displacement
of Istrian populations, forcing between 200,000 and
350,000 ethnic Italians, Slovenians and Croats to
migrate in different directions (Ballinger 2003: 1-3).
Neighbouring Trieste was an identity hotspot for
centuries, but with the rise of Italian nationalism and
the fascist resurgence of ‘Italianità’ the presence of
any Slovenian (the minority’s self-designation) or
‘uncivilised’ Slavs (their Italian ‘nomination’) was
undesirable. On the Istrian border Italians fled their
homes under the recurrent waves of oppression that
shook Communist Yugoslavia. From 1950 onwards,
Italian refugees from Titoist Yugoslavia and Italian
immigrants from elsewhere were settled on the
Slovene-populated corridor around Trieste. Even
today, Italian, Croatian and Slovenian narratives de-
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monise the ‘other’ side denying any responsibility
for human loss and suffering. Notably, Italians celeb-
rate Trieste's return to Italy after the Second World
War and remember the massacres of Italians under
Tito’s Yugoslav regime (the ‘Foibes’ massacres). In
February 2004, an Italian parliamentary motion to
declare a day of commemoration for the Italian vic-
tims passed by an overwhelming 502-15, sanctioning
Italian versions of memory systemically. It is signi-
ficant that the motion enjoyed support even from the
formerly communist Democrats of the Left (The
Economist, 26 August 2004). What was forgotten in
all this was the Italian oppression and persecution
of the Slovenian populations of Trieste in the past –
another version of history favoured by Slovenians
that would infuriate any supporter of basic human
rights.
Similar cases of solitary amnesia characterised the
communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe
and their post-1989 successors. After the end of the
Second World War, active resistance to fascism en-
abled the forging of new versions of the past as a
means to the future: ‘the natural scapegoat was “the
Germans”, just as now “the Soviets” are blamed for
the pains of the Communist era’ (Esbenshade 1995:
79; Wertsch 2002: 106-112). This diverted attention
from the political conduct of the communist regimes,
including their hunting for votes of ex-Nazis and
practices of lustration and de-communisation. Espe-
cially the question of lustration appeared on public
agendas in most post-communist countries, creating
major controversies concerning patterns of transition-
al justice (Kritz 1995). In post-communist Poland,
legislation was introduced, which aimed to protect
the identity of former communists and to resolve
political tensions generated by the communist past
(Misztal 1999; Misztal 2003: 152). Nevertheless,
continuous external and internal criticism forced the
government to introduce a lustration law in 1999, in
an attempt to ease off the tensions. Other examples
of systemic manipulation of memory in pre-1989
European countries include the ‘airbrushing’ of the
1948 Slovak leader, Vladimir Clementis, out of offi-
cial photographs after his trial and execution, and
the memory repression of the 1968 Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia, which Kundera extensively re-
counts in his work (Kundera 1981: 14). These cases
present ostensible similarities when examined com-
paratively: individually, each aims at securing sys-
temic (re)integration, and jointly they respond to
global political pressures for (re)integration into a
wider political system following the 1989 revolu-
tions.
Conclusion
The examples used in this study point in one direc-
tion: the institution of solitary amnesia, with its
power to formalise nationalist Weltanschaung, falls
short of the ability to humanise pain and grant it with
intersubjective meaning. This is so because its func-
tion is to ensure the preservation of systemic prin-
ciples in a rational and efficient manner, not to do
justice to harmed others (Ricoeur 2004: 89). When
reflecting critically on European examples, one can
argue that solitary amnesia embodies nationalist
narratives-as-discourse: its aim is to make things
happen, to support affirmative action on the political
environment that the nation inhabits. Such type of
action is monopolised by power, and sidesteps
democratic consensus, to preserve the integrity of
the system. To challenge Habermas’ (1989b: 337-8)
positive standpoint one may observe that when the
cogwheels of power are set in motion lifeworld
agency fades in the background, leaving the public
sphere a hollow space ready to be colonised by the
politics of the moment.
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